The book “Justice For Raymond” by Raymond McCord Senior and “the Ballast Report” by Nuala O’Loan (Mrs) , Police Ombudsman For Northern Ireland
details:
One man’s ten-year fight to track down his son’s killers and bring them to justice.
IN 9th November 1997, the body of 22 year-old former RAF radar operator, Raymond McCord was found dumped at Ballyduff quarry, Newtownabbey, just a few miles outside Belfast. He had been killed with a concrete breeze block. His face had been so badly disfigured form the rain of blows that his coffin had to remain closed during his funeral. The outlawed UVF, the oldest Protestant paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, had killed him on the jailhouse order of mark Haddock, the head of the drug-dealing unit in the north Belfast suburb of Mount Vernon, Haddock heard that Raymond McCord Jnr was about to reveal his activities to the leadership of the UVF.
http://www.policeombudsman.org/publicationsuploads/BALLAST-PUBLIC-STATEMENT-22-01-07-FINAL-VERSION1.pdf
Statement by The Police Ombudsman of Northern Ireland on her investigation into the circumstances surrounding the Death of Raymond McCord Junior and related matters
This Statement is published in accordance with Section 62 of the Police
(Northern Ireland) Act 1998 and is a report on the Police Ombudsman’s
investigation into matters surrounding the death of Raymond McCord
Junior. The report is based on the findings of an extensive investigation
by the Police Ombudsman, including interviews with former and serving
police officers and the assessment of intelligence reports and many
thousands of other documents held within the policing system, only
some of which will be referred to in this Statement.
Nuala O’Loan (Mrs) , Police Ombudsman For Northern Ireland
22nd January 2007
CONTENTS
SECTION ONE: A MAJOR INVESTIGATION
The role of the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland
Executive Summary
1. Introduction
2. Human Rights Issues
3. Initial concerns – Matters brought to the attention of the Secretary of State and the Northern Ireland Office
4. Matters brought to the attention of the Chief Constable
5. Matters brought to the attention of the Surveillance Commissioner
6. The initiation and scope of the investigation
7. The review of the investigation
8. Difficulties encountered during the investigation
SECTION FOUR: INTELLIGENCE LINKING INFORMANT 1 AND OTHERS
TO OTHER CRIMES
23. CID searches blocked by Special Branch, 1997
24. Planned attack and attack in the Republic of Ireland, 1996 and 1997
25. Targeting of a Republican, 1994
26. Arson attack and other crimes, 1997
27. Drug Dealing in North Belfast and Larne
28. “Punishment” shootings and attacks
29. Possession of Information Likely to be of Use to Terrorists
SECTION FIVE
30. Financial arrangements and Informant 1
SECTION SIX
31. Informant Handling, Supervision and Management
SECTION SEVEN
32. Collusion
SECTION EIGHT
33. Conclusions
34. Recommendations
APPENDIX A
Changes to PSNI Working Practices Since 2003
SECTION TWO: THE MURDER OF RAYMOND McCORD JUNIOR.
9. The murder of Raymond McCord Junior and the subsequent investigation by the Police
SECTION THREE: INTELLIGENCE LINKING INFORMANT 1 AND OTHERS
TO MURDER AND ATTEMPTED MURDER
10. The murder of Mr Peter McTasney, 1991
11. The attempted murders of Intended Victim One, Intended Victim Two, Intended Victim Three and Intended Victim Four, 1989-1991
12. The attempted murder of Intended Victim Five, 1992
13. The murder of Ms Sharon McKenna, 1993
14. The murder of Mr Sean McParland, 1994
15. The murders of Mr Gary Convie and Mr Eamon Fox, 1994
16. The murder of Mr Gerald Brady and associated incidents, 1994
17. The murder of Mr Thomas Sheppard, 1996
18. The murder of Mr John Harbinson, 1997
19. The murder of Mr Thomas English, 2000
20. The attempted murders of Intended Victims Six and Seven, in 1992 and 1997
21. The attempted murders of Intended Victim Eight
22. The attempted murder of Intended Victims Nine and Ten
SECTION FOUR: INTELLIGENCE LINKING INFORMANT 1 AND OTHERS
TO OTHER CRIMES
23. CID searches blocked by Special Branch, 1997
24. Planned attack and attack in the Republic of Ireland, 1996 and 1997
25. Targeting of a Republican, 1994
26. Arson attack and other crimes, 1997
27. Drug Dealing in North Belfast and Larne
28. “Punishment” shootings and attacks
29. Possession of Information Likely to be of Use to Terrorists
SECTION FIVE
30. Financial arrangements and Informant 1
SECTION SIX
31. Informant Handling, Supervision and Management
SECTION SEVEN
32. Collusion
SECTION EIGHT
33. Conclusions
34. Recommendations
APPENDIX A
Changes to PSNI Working Practices Since 200
THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF POLICE OMBUDSMAN FOR NORTHERN
IRELAND.
The Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland is:
• Established by the Police (NI) Act 1998.
• Accountable to Parliament through the Secretary of State.
• Constituted and operated independently of the Northern Ireland Policing Board and the Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
• Required to have regard to guidance issued by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
• An executive, non-departmental body financed by Grant in Aid from the Northern Ireland Office.
The Police (NI) Act 1998 directs the Police Ombudsman to;
• Exercise her powers in such a manner and to such an extent as appears to her to best secure: (a) the efficiency, effectiveness and independence of the police complaints system and (b) the confidence of the public and members of the police service in that system.
• Observe all requirements of confidentiality.
• Receive complaints and other referred matters and decide how to deal with them.
• Receive and record policy complaints and refer them to the Chief Constable.
• Make recommendations to the Director of Public Prosecutions for criminal prosecution.
• Make recommendations and directions in respect of disciplinary action against police officers.
• Notify the Secretary of State, the Northern Ireland Policing Board and the Chief Constable of the outcome of certain complaints, referred matters and any investigation which the Police Ombudsman initiates without complaint.
• Report annually to the Secretary of State.
The Police (NI) Act 2000 directs the Police Ombudsman to:
• Carry out enquiries as directed by the Secretary of State and;
• Supply statistical information to the Northern Ireland Policing Board.
The Police (NI) Act 2003 directs the Police Ombudsman to:
• Investigate a current policy or practice if (a) the practice or policy comes to her attention under the Police (NI) Act 1988 and (b) she has
reason to believe that it would be in the public interest to investigate it.
• Investigate a current policy or practice if (a) the practice or policy comes to her attention under the Police (NI) Act 1988 and (b) she has reason to believe that it would be in the public interest to investigate it.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. In May 2002 Mr Raymond McCord Senior made a complaint to the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland about police conduct in relation to the murder of his son, Mr Raymond McCord Junior. His complaint alleged that police over a number of years, acted in such a way as to protect informants from being fully accountable to the law.
2. Preliminary enquiries following receipt of Mr McCord’s complaint showed that there were sufficient issues of concern to warrant a wide-ranging investigation not only into matters relating to the investigation of Mr McCord’s son’s murder, butalso into the police handling and management of identified informants from the early 1990s onwards.
3. In the course of the investigation the Police Ombudsman sought the cooperation of a number of retired RUC/PSNI senior officers. Officers who were being treated as witnesses were asked to provide anexplanation of Special Branch and CID internal practices during this period. Investigators offered to meet retired officers at venues with which they would be comfortable and at times which would suit them.
They were advised of the areas of questioning and provided with significant disclosure of information, at their request. The majority of them failed even to reply. This was despite the fact that witness details would be anonomised in any public statement. Amongst those who refused were two retired Assistant Chief Constable’s, seven Detective Chief Superintendent’s and two Detective Superintendent’s.
4. Some retired officers did assist the investigation, and were helpful. Officers varied a great deal in the manner in which they responded to questions. Some, including some retired officers dealt with challenging questions in a professional manner.
5. Others, including some serving officers, gave evasive, contradictory, and on occasion farcical answers to questions. On occasion those answers indicated either a significant failure to understand the law, or contempt for the law. On other occasions the investigation demonstrated conclusively that what an officer had told the Police Ombudsman’s investigators was completely untrue.
6. The Police Ombudsman’s initial concerns about PSNI informant management processes caused her to alert the Chief Constable to those concerns in March 2003. She subsequently made him aware on 8 September 2003 of her very detailed concerns about these matters.
She also alerted the Surveillance Commissioner on 15 September 2003. He carried out an inspection of the Special Branch handling of Informant 1. That inspection found serious failings by Special Branch to comply with the requirements of the law in relation to the handling of informants.
7. The wider investigation was focused on seven main lines of enquiry, which had emerged during preliminary enquiries and in respect of which serious concerns had arisen.
They were, in chronological order of event:
• two attempted murders in 1991.
• the murder of Sharon McKenna on 17 January 1993.
• the attempted bombing of the Sinn Fein office in Monaghan on 3 March 1997.
• the blocking by Special Branch of searches during a pre-planned CID operation in tended to disrupt the activities of the UVF.
• the murder of John Harbinson on 18 May 1997.
• the murder of Raymond McCord Junior on 9 November 1997.
• Informant 1’s alleged involvement in drug-dealing between 1994 and 2003.
8. Other issues emerged during the course of the investigation and were
considered as part of the investigation.
9. Intelligence reports and other documents within the RUC and the PSNI,
most of which were rated as ‘reliable and probably true’, linked informants, and in particular one man who was a police informant (referred to in this report as Informant
1) to the following ten murders:
• Mr Peter McTasney who died on 24 February 1991;
• Ms Sharon McKenna who died on 17 January 1993;
• Mr Sean McParland who was attacked on 17 February 1994, and died on 25 February 1994;
• Mr Gary Convie who died on 17 May 1994;
• Mr Eamon Fox who died on 17 May 1994, in the same attack as Mr Gary Convie;
• Mr Gerald Brady who died on 17 June 1994;
• Mr Thomas Sheppard who died on 21 March 1996;
• Mr John Harbinson who died on 18 May 1997;
• Mr Raymond McCord Junior who died on 09 November 1997
• Mr Thomas English who died on 31 October 2000.
The Police Ombudsman’s investigators also identified less significant
police intelligence implicating Informant 1 in 5 other murders. For someof these murders, ther e is generally only one piece of intelligence,
which police have not rated as reliable. Intelligence was also found linking police informants, and in particular Informant 1, to ten attempt ed murders between 1989 and 2002.
Intelligence was also found which implicated police informants, and in particular, Informant 1, in a significant number of crimes in respect of which no action or insufficient action was taken:
Intelligence was also found which implicated police informants, and in
particular, Informant 1, in a significant number of crimes in respect of
which no action or insufficient action was taken:
• Armed robbery;
• Assault and Grievous Bodily Harm;
• Punishment shootings and attacks;
• Possession of munitions;
• Criminal Damage;
• Drug dealing;
• Extortion;
• Hijacking;
• Intimidation;
• Conspiracy to murder
• Threats To Kill
10. Conclusions of the Police Ombudsman about the allegations made by Mr Raymond McCord about the death of his son.
Allegation 1: that a senior UVF figure had ordered the murder of his son, and that this individual was a police informant.
Finding: The Police Ombudsman can confirm that a police informant is a suspect in the murder of Mr McCord’s son. She cannot confirm or deny who that individual is.
Allegation 2 : that police had failed to carry out a thorough investigation of his son’s murder, and had failed to keep him updated about their investigation.
Findings: The Police Ombudsman has identified failures in the investigation of Mr McCord’s son’s murder. These failures may have significantly reduced the possibility of anyone being prosecuted for the murder.
There is some material which indicates some contact between specific police officers and Mr McCord, particularly during the days immediately following the murder. There has been a failure by those supervising the conduct of the police investigation to consider the benefit of identifying at the very least a single point of contact for Mr McCord. Such provision may have allowed the investigation to progress more effectively.
This allegation is therefore substantiated.
Allegation 3: that no-one had been arrested or charged with the murder of his son. Mr McCord alleged that this was because the man who ordered the murder was a police informant, and that this individual, and those working for him, had been protected from arrest and prosecution for a number of years.
Findings: A number of people were arrested for Raymond McCord Junior’s murder. No one has been charged with the murder. There is no evidence that anyone has been protected from arrest for the murder of Raymond McCord Junior.
With reference to Mr McCord’s allegation that a police informant had ordered his son’s murder, and that this individual and those working for him had been protected from arrest and prosecution for years the Police Ombudsman conducted an extensive
investigation which is detailed in this Report. It is clear that much intelligence was disregarded by police and that they continued to use Informant 1 despite his criminal record and the extensive intelligence they held in respect of alleged serious
criminality, because he had value to them as an informant. This was wrong.
This allegation is therefore substantiated with the exception, firstly, of that part of it which refers to police failure to arrest anyone for Raymond McCord Junior’s murder, and secondly, of the fact that, whilst the Police Ombudsman can confirm that an
informer is a suspect in the murd er of Mr McCord’s son, she cannot confirm or deny who that individual is.
Allegation 4: That unidentified police knew something was going to happen to Raymond McCord Junior, but that they did not warn him or his family about this danger to protect the police informant who was responsible for the murder.
Finding: The Police Ombudsman has found no evidence or intelligence to support this allegation. It is not substantiated.
11. There are grave concerns about the practices of some police officers.
The activities which were identified included:
•Failure to arrest informants for crimes to which those informants had allegedly confessed, or to treat such persons as suspects for crime;
•The concealment of intelligence indicating that on a number of occasions up to three informants had been involved in a murder and other serious crime;• Arresting informants suspected of murder, then subjecting them to lengthy sham interviews at which they were not challenged about their alleged crime, and releasing them without charge;
• Creating interview notes which were deliberately misleading; failing to record and maintain original interview notes and failing to record notes of meetings with informants;
• Not recording in any investigation papers the fact that an informant was suspected of a crime despite the fact that he had been arrested and interviewed for that crime;
Not informing the Director of Public Prosecutions that an informant was a suspect in a crime in respect of which an investigation file was submitted to the Director;
• Withholding from police colleagues intelligence, including the names of alleged suspects, which could have been used to prevent or detect crime;
• An instance of blocking searches of a police informant’s home and of other locations including an alleged UVF arms dump;
• Providing at least four misleading and inaccurate documents for possible consideration by the Court in relation to four separate incidents and the cases resulting from them, where those documents had the effect of protecting an informant;
Finding munitions at an informant’s home and doing nothing about that matter;
• Withholding information about the location to which a group of murder suspects had allegedly fled after a murder;
• Giving instructions to junior officers that records should not be completed, and that there should be no record of the incident concerned;
• Ensuring the absence of any official record linking a UVF informant to possession of explosives which may, and were thought according to a Special Branch officer’s private records, to have been used in a particular crime;
Cancelling the “wanted” status of murder suspects “ because of lack of resources ” and doing nothing further about those suspects;
• Destroying or losing forensic exhibits such as metal bars;
• Continuing to employ as informants people suspected of involvement in the most serious crime, without assessing the attendant risks or their suitability as informants;
• Not adopting or complying with the United Kingdom Home Office Guidelines on matters relating to informant handling, and by not complying with the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act when it came into force in 2000.
12. The cumulative effect of these activities, as described by police officers and as demonstrated in documentation recovered, was to protect Informant 1 and other informants from investigation. In the absence of explanation as to why these events occurred, the Police Ombudsman has concluded that this was collusion by certain police officers with identified UVF informants.
13. It is accepted by the Police Ombudsman that intelligence, in itself, is
not evidence. However it may be possible to derive investigative opportunities from intelligence. There were mechanisms which were used by other police forces within the United Kingdom to prevent the failings of informant and intelligence handling identified in this Report.
Those mechanisms should have involved clear and effective policies for informant handling, combined with regular training and effective intrusive management.
14. Although such systems were used, to some extent by RUC CID, they were not used by Special Branch. In 1997 the RUC introduced new rules for informant handling
and management. A decision was made by Chief Officers that those rules should not apply to Special Branch.
The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act in 2000 imposed statutory rules about the review, management, assessment and cancellation of informants. The Surveillance Commissioner found, following the referral of the matter by the Police Ombudsman, that those rules had not been complied with in the case of Informant 1, and that there had
been a failure to meet National Minimum Standards and to take into account intelligence about Informant 1’s own criminal conduct.
15. In the course of the investigation the Police Ombudsman has estimated that payments of at least £79,840 were made to Informant1.
16. The Police Ombudsman has made 20 recommendations and the
PSNI response to these recommendations is included in the Report.
PSNI have accepted all the recommendations made to them.
17. Prior to 2003 some RUC/PSNI Special Branch officers facilitated the
situation in which informants were able to continue to engage in paramilitary activity, some of them holding senior positions in the UVF, despite the availability of
extensive information as to their alleged involvement in crime. Those informants must have known that they were not being dealt with for crime. Some RUC/PSNI officers
were complicit in the failure to deal appropriately with Informant 1, and other informants, both by way of criminal investigation and by ceasing to use them as informants.
18. Since 2003 the PSNI has made significant changes and introduced new policies and working practices in relation to its strategic management of its new Crime Operations Department, which includes Intelligence Branch (formerly Special Branch) under a single Assistant Chief Constable.
19. It is hoped that the further necessary changes, consequential upon this Report will combine with the change already made, to ensure that never again, within the PSNI will there be the circumstances which prevailed for so long in relation to the informant handling and intelligence managements processes which are discussed in this Report.
It is also essential that, in the arrangements for the future strategic management of National Security issues in Northern Ireland, there will be accountability mechanisms which are effective, and which are capable of ensuring that what has happened does not recur.
.
SECTION ONE A MAJOR INVESTIGATION
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Mr McCord’s statement of complaint alleged that police over a number of years, acted in such a way as to protect informants from being fully accountable to the law. It included the following specific allegations:
• that a senior UVF figure had ordered the murder of his son, and that this individual was a police informer;
• that police had failed to carry out a thorough investigation of his son’s murder, and had failed to keep him updated about their investigation;
•that no-one had been arrested or charged with the murder of his son. Mr McCord alleged that this was because the man who ordered the murder was a police informant, and that this individual, and those working for him, had been protected from arrest and prosecution for a number of years;
• that unidentified police knew something was going to happen to Raymond McCord Junior, but that they did not warn him or his family about this danger to protect the police informant who was responsible for the murder.
1.2 Following initial enquiries of the PSNI in relation to Mr McCord’s allegations, the Police Ombudsman established that there was intelligence strongly indicating the involvement of informants in several murders and serious crimes. Accordingly the terms of reference of the investigation were widened.
1.3 This report will provide a summary of the investigation which was given the name Operation Ballast. From its outset it has been a criminal enquiry into the actions of police officers. During Operation Ballast investigators have examined a number of incidents in relation to Mr. McCord’s wide-ranging allegation that police shielded an informant and his associates in the UVF, from arrest and prosecution over a number of years. This Report relates to the period from 1991 –2003.
1.4 Over the years, different official terms have been used to describe individuals who supply information to the police. At various stages they have been described as informants, sources, agents, and, with the introduction of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, Covert Human Intelligence Sources, or CHIS.
For ease of reference, this report will generally refer to such people as “informants”.
1.5 This report is published by the Police Ombudsman as a report under
Section 62 of the Police (Northern Ireland) Act 1998, as she considers that it is in the public interest so to do, given the gravity of the allegations and of the findings of the investigation.
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
2.1 The Police Ombudsman has a statutory duty to investigate allegations of criminality against the police, including allegations such as those made by Mr McCord that the po
lice may have “colluded” with paramilitary informants.
2.2 There are significant risks to the lives of people who are publicly revealed to be, or to have been,paramilitary informants. Northern Ireland has a history of the murder
of those who were even suspected of being informants. The most recent murder is thought to be that of a self-confessed informant, who died in 2005.
2.3 The Police Ombudsman has a duty to act in compliance with Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This article not only confers rights on individuals who may be informants, but also confers obligations on investigators in terms of the nature and scope of the investigation of any matter in which representatives of the State may have colluded with murderers.
2.4 This report will refer to relevant police informants only as informants.
No reference will be made to these informants’ real names, their relatives’ names, their police code-names or their police source numbers.
2.5 The Police Ombudsman will neither confirm nor deny whether the informants referred to in this report are the individuals against whom Mr. McCord has made his allegations. Nor will she confirm or deny whether any individual is, or ever has been, an informant for the police or any part of the security forces.
2.6 Over the years, different official terms have been used to describe individuals who supply information to the police. At various stages they have been described as informants, sources, agents, and, with the introduction of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, Covert Human Intelligence Sources, or CHIS. For ease of reference, this report will generally refer to such people as “informants”. They will be described as “Informant 1”and other “Informants”.
2.7 There remains a risk to police officers who have been involved in the handling and management of terrorist informants. Many of these individuals have now retired, but some are still serving officers. This Report will refer to such officers by
their rank in the relevant period and by letter, e.g. Detective Constable A, B, C etc. in alphabetical order as they occur in this report.
2.8 There may also be a risk to other people mentioned in this report and
they will therefore be described using letters: A, B, C et cetera.
INITIAL CONCERNS
3.1 Following receipt of Mr McCord’s complaint, preliminary enquiries were undertaken by the Police Ombudsman. These uncovered a large amount of police intelligence, which implicated informants in murder and other serious criminal activity. It uncovered anomalies in relation to a range of Special Branch material relating to informants within the UVF.
3.2 Of particular concern were disturbing irregularities in the police management of the individual who will henceforth be referred to as Informant 1. These irregularities related to the handling, controlling and management of Informant 1, about whom there was considerable intelligence, indicative of linkage with the most serious crime, in the
RUC systems. It is accepted by the Police Ombudsman that intelligence, in itself, is not evidence. However it may be capable of providing evidential opportunities which then require to be explored.
3.3 When an informant is used by police officers, there is an obligation to assess the informant continually, and also to assess and process any information received. On review of the RUC material, it was discovered that there was no record of any
individual written assessment of Informant 1 between 1991 and 1999, and no written assessment between 2000 and 2003, which took into account the large amount of
intelligence implicating him in serious criminal activity, including murder.
3.4 Preliminary enquiries showed, therefore, that there were sufficient issues of concern to warrant a wide-ranging investigation into the police handling and management of identified informants from the early 1990s onwards. The investigation focused on seven main lines of enquiry.
3.5 They were as follows:
• two attempted murders in 1991.
• the murder of Sharon McKenna on 17 January 1993.
• the attempted bombing of the Sinn Fein office in Monaghan on 3 March 1997.
• the Operation Mechanic Searches.
• the murder of John Harbinson on 18 May 1997.
• the murder of Raymond McCord Junior on 9 November 1997.
•Informant 1’s alleged involvement in drug-dealing between 1994 and 2003.
Other issues emerged during the course of the enquiry and are also referred to in this Report.
MATTERS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE
3.6 The Police Ombudsman was concerned about the implications, for her other ongoing investigative work, of conducting the investigation into
these matters, because of the anticipated scale of the investigation, and its complex subject matter. She knew that it was inevitable that the McCord investigation would impact adversely on her ability to carry out her other obligations. Accordingly
she explained the seriousness of the allegations to the Secretary of State,
and requested additional funding from the Northern Ireland Office for this enquiry and two other very serious investigations. That request was made on 22 January 2003.
This request for extra funding was not met, although a sum of £250,000 was provided on 27 November 2003 to assist the Police Ombudsman in
these enquiries.
3.7 This sum did not meet the anticipated cost of these enquiries. The Police Ombudsman, however, decided it was still her duty to conduct these investigations, al
though it was recognised that it would mean resources would have to be diverted from other investigations. It also meant that this investigation was slower than would have been the case had additional resources been made available. It was not possible to start the formal stage of the investigation until 2 June 2003.
MATTERS OF CONCERN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION
OF THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF THE PSNI
4.1 The Police Ombudsman rapidly became concerned about informant
handling processes within the RUC/PSNI, and she decided that it was necessary to alert the Chief Constable to those concerns so that he could take any necessary action to address the emerging problems as rapidly as possible. She therefore communicated her concerns about problems relating to informant handling to the Chief Constable in
meetings on 25 March 2003 and other occasions. The Police Ombudsman’s Executive Director of Investigations then wrote to the Chief Constable on 8 September 2003, alerting him to serious concerns about the PSNI management of informants, and the potential failures in police practice which had already been identified.
MATTERS OF CONCERN BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION
OF THE SURVEILLANCE COMMISSIONER
5.1 The Surveillance Commissioner is required by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act to inspect the level of police compliance with the requirements of the
Act. Preliminary enquiries had indicated to the Police Ombudsman that previous inspections by the Surveillance Commissioner had not identified significant non-compliance by the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
His report of 26 February 2003, whilst identifying some failings stated
“The majority of CHIS are working for Special Branch in the National Security area and are well handled and controlled.”
He also concluded, “Overall there continues to be a high level of compliance with the legislation and codes of practice.”
5.2 Accordingly the Police Ombudsman brought her concerns to the
attention of the Surveillance Commissioner on 15 September 2003. The Surveillance Commissioner conducted a further inspection on 2 and 3 October 2003 and reported on 4 October 2004.
5.3 On 6 October 2003 the PSNI set up a Covert Human Intelligence Source Risk Analysis Group to undertake a full and comprehensive risk analysis of all PSNI informants.
On 23 August 2004 the PSNI wrote to the Police Ombudsman advising her of the progress of the Covert Human Intelligence Source Risk Analysis Group to that date
One of the outcomes was that 24% of informants were cancelled. 12% of all informants were cancelled because they no longer provided useful information and 12% because they were involved in serious crime
THE INITIATION AND SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION
6.1 As a consequence of her emerging findings, the Police Ombudsman decided that there should be an extensive investigation into Mr. McCord’s complaint, and the issues arising from it, and that the terms of reference of the enquiry should be widened to include:
• the collection and analysis of specific informant files and authorities for the deployment of those informants;
• intelligence in respect of named individuals and incidents; and
• enquiries into police actions in respect of the investigation of many identified murders and other serious crimes.
6.2 The Police Ombudsman has examined police processes for the handling and management of informants, and intelligence from, and about, informants from within a UVF unit in North Belfast and Newtownabbey, primarily from 1991-2003, although reference is made to matters occurring from 1989. Intelligence indicates that members of this unit were responsible for the murder of Raymond McCord Junior. The Police
Ombudsman has also examined whether the actions of police officers may have prevented these people from being held accountable for any crimes, including the murders of Raymond McCord Junior and other individuals.
6.3 Analysis of information about the informants whose alleged activities emerged during the course of this Report, which focused on the activities of Informant 1, indicated a high level of alleged criminality.
Mr Wijat's friend Magic Rabbit 
Prince William about 15 years old
